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 Critics of the proliferation of omnibus legislation in Congress have pointed to the 
constitutions of the American states as providing an alternative, and potentially superior, 
model for lawmaking.1 Forty-three state constitutions include some sort of “single-subject” 
rule, that is, the requirement that each act of the legislature be limited to a single subject. 
Many of these provisions date back to the second quarter of the nineteenth century, and, 
collectively, they have been the subject of literally thousands of court decisions.2 Nor is 
the rule a relic from a bygone era; one recent study found the rule at stake in 102 cases 
in 2016 alone.3 Many of these decisions have involved controversial, hot-button issues. 
In the last two decades, state courts have used single-subject rules to invalidate laws 
dealing with, inter alia, firearms regulation,4 abortion,5 tort reform,6 immigration,7 local 
                                                          
1 See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning & Brooks R. Smith, The Truth-in-Legislation Amendment: An Idea Whose Time has 
Come, 78 Tenn. L. Rev. 831 (2011); Brannon P. Denning & Brooks R. Smith, Uneasy Riders: The Case for a Truth-in-
Legislation Amendment, 1999 Utah L. Rev. 957 (1999); M. Albert Figinski, Maryland’s Constitutional One-Subject 
Rule: Neither a Dead Letter nor an Undue Restriction, 27 U. Balt. L. Rev. 363, 390-94 (1998).  
2 See, e.g., Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 803, 818-22 
(2006). Gilbert’s count includes cases dealing with voter initiatives. Twenty-four states provide for the voter 
initiative process, and eighteen of those states require voter initiatives to comply with a single-subject 
requirement. See generally Rachel Downey, Michelle Hargrove and Vanessa Locklin, A Survey of the Single Subject 
Rule as Applied to Statewide Initiatives, 13 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 579 (2004). As voter initiatives pose distinctive 
issues with respect to the potential value of a single-subject requirement, see, e.g., Kurt G. Kastorf, Logrolling Gets 
Logrolled: Same-Sex Marriage, Direct Democracy, and the Single Subject Rule, 54 Emory L.J. 1633 (2005), this 
article focuses largely on cases that apply single-subject requirements to acts of state legislatures, and addresses 
analyses of the single-subject rule that focus on legislative enactments rather than initiatives.  
3 See Daniel N. Boger, 103 Va. L. Rev. 1247, 1249 (2017).  
4 See, e.g., Leach v. Commonwealth, 141 A.3d 426 (Pa. 2016); Unity Church of St. Paul v. State, 694 N.W.2d 585 
(Minn. 2005). 
5 See, e.g., Burns v. Cline, 382 P.3d 1048 (Ok. 2016).  
6 See, e.g., Douglas v. Cox Retirement Properties, Inc., 302 P.3d 789 (Ok. 2013). State ex rel Ohio Academy of Trial 
Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999) 
7 See, e.g., Thomas v. Henry, 260 P.3d 1251 (Ok. 2011). 
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minimum wage laws,8 sex offenders,9 enhanced criminal penalties,10 and school 
vouchers.11 
Yet, despite having long been a part of the constitutional law of most states,12 the 
single-subject rule is deeply problematic. Courts and commentators have been unable to 
come up with a clear and consistent definition of what constitutes a “single subject.” 
Instead, a persistent theme in the single-subject jurisprudence has been the inevitable 
“indeterminacy” of “subject”13 and a recognition that whether a measure consists of one 
subject or many will frequently be “in the eye of the beholder.”14 On the one hand, as the 
Michigan Supreme Court once explained, “[t]here is virtually no statute that could not be 
subdivided and enacted as several bills”15 On the other hand, as an older Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court case put it, “no two subjects are so wide apart that they may not be 
brought into a common focus, if the point of view be carried back far enough.”16 
In practice, the meaning and enforcement of the rule has usually turned on how 
deferential the court thinks it ought to be to the legislature or, conversely, how much it 
sees the combination of topics in a new law as reflecting the legislature’s defiance of the 
norms of proper law-making. Over the past century and a half, state courts for the most 
                                                          
8 See, e.g., Cooperative Home Care, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 514 S.W.2d 571 (Mo. 2017). 
9 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603 (Pa. 2013). 
10 See, e.g., People v. Cervantes, 723 N.E.2d 265 (Ill. 1999). 
11 See, e.g., Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999).  
12 State constitutions and state courts are a vital but understudied component of the American legal system. 
Moreover, even when scholars turn their attentions to state constitutionalism, they tend to focus on state 
analogues to federal constitutional provisions, such as those involving free speech, equality, due process, or 
criminal procedure, see, e.g., Jeffrey S. Sutton, 51 Imperfect Solutions: States and the Making of American 
Constitutional Law (Oxford U. Press 2018). rather than on the legislative process restrictions that are a truly 
distinctive feature of state constitutionalism. 
13 See Ore. Educ. Ass’n v. Phillips, 727 P.2d 602, 612 (Ore. 1986) (Linde, J. concurring). 
14 See Daniel H. Lowenstein, California Initiative and the Single-Subject Rule, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 936, 938 (1983).  
15 People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 722 (Mich. 1994). 
16 Payne v. School Dist. Of Borough of Coudersport, 31 A. 1072, 1074 (Pa. 1895).  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3499721 
3 
 
part appear to have given a liberal interpretation to the concept of “single subject” and 
have rejected most single-subject challenges to state legislation.17 Even with the uptick 
in findings of violations in recent decades,18 the meaning of the rule remains murky, with 
the case law consisting of a mix of unpredictable “I know it when I see it” decisions.19 
Due to the slipperiness of subject, many analyses have focused on what are 
regularly said to be the primary purposes of the rule – the prevention of legislative 
logrolling and riders, and the promotion of a more orderly and informed legislative process 
-- and have called for reframing the enforcement of the rule around the advancement of 
these goals. But determining whether a law is the product of logrolling, or whether a 
provision should be treated as a rider, will often be difficult. Moreover, it is far from clear 
that logrolls and riders are as pernicious as proponents of more vigorous enforcement of 
the single subject rule assume. So, too, the more aggressive use of the single-subject 
rule urged by advocates as a means of thwarting “legislative chicanery”20 and “backroom 
politics”21 could also undo the cooperation and compromise necessary to get difficult but 
important legislation enacted.  
                                                          
17 The leading study of the first century of the single-subject rule is Millard H. Ruud, No Law Shall Embrace More 
than One Subject, 42 Minn. L. Rev. 389 (1958). Professor Ruud concluded that “the one-subject rule . . . appears as 
a weak and undependable arrow in [the] quiver” of anyone challenging state legislation. Id. at 447. Nearly sixty 
years later, another comprehensive study similarly concluded that “most states have . . . given little weight to their 
respective single subject rules. Justin W. Evans & Mark. C. Bannister, Reanimating the States’ Single Subject 
Jurisprudence: A New Constitutional Test, 39 So. Ill. U.L.J. 163, 163 (2015). See also Unity Church of St. Paul, supra, 
694 N.W.2d at 592 (noting that Minnesota had found only five single-subject violations148 years); Porten Sullivan, 
supra, 568 A.2d at 402 (only two violations in 139 years).  
18 See Martha J. Dragich, State Constitutional Restrictions on Legislative Procedure: Rethinking the Analysis of 
Original Purpose, Single Subject, and Clear Title Challenges, 38 Harv. J. Legis. 103, 106 (2001), Denning & Smith, 
supra, 1999 Utah L. Rev. at 996-97. 
19 Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
20 Denning & Smith, supra, 78 Tenn. L. Rev. at 832. 
21 Note, Tipping Point: Missouri’s Single Subject Provision, 72 Mo. L. Rev. 1387, 1389 (2007). 
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Part II of this article briefly reviews the history and purposes behind the single-
subject rule. Part III examines how state courts have applied the single-subject rule, with 
particular attention to some recent state supreme court single-subject cases interpreting 
the rule. Part IV focuses on arguments for reframing enforcement of the rule more tightly 
around its purposes, particular the goals of preventing logrolling or riders. Part V 
concludes by reflecting of the significance of the failure of the rule to achieve its goal of 
reforming state legislative processes. 
II. The History and Purposes of the Single-Subject Rule 
A. History 
Scholars have traced concerns about omnibus legislation and the norm of requiring 
laws to be limited to a single subject to the Lex Cecilia Didia of the Roman Republic.22 
Early instances of single-subject requirements in the American setting include a complaint 
by the Privy Council about the practices of the legislature of the Massachusetts Bay 
Colony,23 and a 1702 directive of Queen Anne to the royal governor of the New Jersey 
colony against the adoption of laws “intermixing in one Act” unrelated subjects.24 The 
constitutions -- federal and state – adopted after the Revolution did not include a single-
subject requirement. But that soon changed. The early nineteenth century witnessed 
growing popular discontent with the performance of state legislatures, including such 
abuses as “[l]ast-minute consideration of important measures, logrolling, mixing 
substantive provisions in omnibus bills, low visibility and hasty enactment of important, 
                                                          
22 See, e.g., Robert Luce, Legislative Procedure: Parliamentary Practices and the Course of Business in the Framing 
of Statutes 548 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1922). 
23 Id. at 549. 
24 Id.  
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and sometimes corrupt legislation, and the attachment of unrelated provisions in the 
amendment process.”25 In response, the states amended their constitutions to impose 
new constraints on their legislatures. Some of these were substantive, such as limits on 
state spending, lending, and borrowing intended to prevent the practices that got many 
states into fiscal difficulties in the 1830s and 1840s.26 Others were procedural, and were 
intended to promote legislative accountability and deliberation. These included, inter alia, 
requirements that votes be reflected in the legislature’s journal; that no bill be altered 
during the legislative process so as to change its legislative purpose; that bills must “age” 
a certain number of days before they can be voted on; that each bill have a title clearly 
disclosing its subject – and that each bill be limited to a single subject.27  
Illinois was the first to adopt a single-subject requirement when it amended its 
constitution in 1818 to direct that bills appropriating salaries for government officials be 
limited to that subject. Michigan in 1843 limited laws authorizing the borrowing of money 
or the issuance of state stock to a single object. In 1844, New Jersey adopted the first 
general single-subject requirement.28 Thereafter, the idea spread quickly. Today, forty-
three states, including every state entering the Union after 1844, includes some version 
of the single-subject rule in its constitution, almost always in the same sentence as the 
clear title requirement.29  
                                                          
25 Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure: Legislative Compliance and Judicial 
Enforcement, 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 797, 798 (1987).  
26 See Richard Briffault & Laurie Reynolds, State and Local Government Law 639-641, 817-18 (8th ed. 2016).  
27Williams, supra, 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 798-99.  
28 See Millard H. Ruud, “No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject,” 42 Minn. L. Rev. 389, 389-90 (1958). 
29 See, e.g., Michael W. Catalano, The Single Subject Rule: A Check on Anti-Majoritarian Logrolling, 3 Emerging 
Issues in State Constitutional Law 77, 80 (1990).  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3499721 
6 
 
There are some variations across the states’ constitutions in the language and 
scope of the rule. Two states apply the requirement only to appropriations bills, and 
another two states limit it to bills adopting special or local laws.30 Conversely, a few states 
exempt appropriations bills from the single-subject requirement,31 and some states 
exclude bills “for the codification, revision, or rearrangement of laws.”32 A handful of states 
use the term “object” rather than “subject,” although that does not appear to have had any 
legal significance.33  Notwithstanding these variations, some version of the single-subject 
requirement is widespread, with roughly three-quarters of state legislatures subject to the 
rule for most enactments. It is probably the “most significant and most litigated procedural 
requirement” in state constitutions.34 The language of the Ohio Constitution is typical: “No 
bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.”35 
B. Purposes 
The purposes of the single-subject rule are briefly stated and often repeated: the 
prevention of logrolling and riders; orderly legislative procedure that promotes informed 
legislative decision-making and public accountability;36 and, less frequently, the 
protection of the governor’s veto power.37 Logrolling and riders, in particular, have been 
                                                          
30 Id.  
31 See Ruud, supra, 42 Minn. L. Rev. at 416.   
32 See, e.g., Ill. Const., art IV., §8(d).  
33 See Ruud, supra, 42 Minn. L. Rev. at 394-96.  
34 Michael J. Kasper, Using Article IV of the Illinois Constitution to Attack Legislation Passed by the General 
Assembly, 40 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 847, 848 (2009). 
35 Ohio Const. Art II, § 15(D). 
36 See generally Ruud, supra, 42 Minn. L. Rev. at 390-91. 
37 See, e.g., Justin W. Evans & Mark C. Bannister, The Meaning and Purpose of State Constitutional Single Subject 
Rules: A Survey of States and the Indiana Example, 49 Val. U. L. Rev. 87, 151-52 (2014); In re Initiative Petition No. 
382, 142 P.3d 400, 405 n. 11 (Okla 2006); Dragich, supra, 38 Harv. J. Legis. at 114-15; Migdal v. State. 747 A.2d 
1225, 1229 (Md. 2000); Hammerschmidt v. Boone Co., 877 S.W.2d 98, 102 (Mo. 1994); Figinski, supra, 27 U. Balt. L. 
Rev. at 366.  
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most frequently cited as the “evils” against which the single-subject rule” is aimed.38 The 
two terms are sometimes blurred together,39 but they refer to somewhat different forms 
of legislative action. “Logrolling” is used to describe what occurs when two or more 
separate proposals, none of which is able to command majority support, are combined 
so that the minorities behind each measure aggregate to a majority capable of passing 
the resulting bill.40 A “rider” is a provision which could not pass on its own but is then 
attached to a bill considered likely to pass and so “rides” on that more popular measure 
to enactment.41  
Both logrolling and riders have been sharply criticized because they lead to the 
adoption of measures that do not enjoy true majority support within the legislature, and, 
to the extent that legislators accurately represent the views of their constituents, within 
the state as a whole. Some courts have also emphasized the degree to which logrolls 
and riders interfere with the freedom of legislators by presenting them with the “Hobson’s 
choice” of being “forced to assent to an unfavorable provision to secure passage of a 
                                                          
38 See, e.g., Ruud, supra, 42 Minn. L. Rev. at 398 (“log-rolling is the evil at which the one-subject rule is aimed”); 
Stephanie Hoffer & Travis McDade, Of Disunity and Logrolling: Ohio’s One-Subject Rule and the Very Evils it was 
Designed to Prevent, 51 Clev. St. L. Rev. 557 (2004). Cf. In re Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause for 2005-2006 
#74, 136 P.3d 237, 243 (Coats, J., dissenting) (“both case law and legislative history make clear that this provision 
must be understood as directed against two specific evils: 1) increasing voting power by combining measures that 
could not be carried on their individual merits, . . . and 2) surprising voters by surreptitiously including unknown 
and alien subjects ‘coiled up in the folds’ of the proposal”) (application of single-subject rule to ballot proposition). 
39 See, e.g., Fent v. State, 214 P.3d 799, 804 (Okla. 2009); Porten Sullivan, supra. 568 A.2d at 1116; State ex rel Ohio 
AFL-CIO v. Voinovich, 631 N.E.2d 582, 604 (Ohio 1994) (Francis E. Sweeney, Sr., J., dissenting in part and concurring 
in part); Dragich, supra, 38 Harv. J. Legis. at 161 (analyzing a case in which it was “hard to say” whether a single-
subject violation involved a logroll or a rider).  
40 See, e.g., Comm. v. Neiman, supra, 84 A.3d at 612. 
41 See, e.g., James Preston Schuck, Returning the One to Ohio’s One-Subject Rule, 28 Cap. L. Rev. 899, 901 (2000). 
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favorable one, or conversely, forced to vote against a favorable provision to ensure that 
an unfavorable provision is not enacted.”42 
Beyond the prevention of logrolling and riders, many courts and commentators cite 
improved legislative deliberation, greater transparency, and the resulting greater 
accountability to the public as purposes of the single-subject rule.43 As the Illinois 
Supreme Court recently explained, one reason for the single-subject rule “is to promote 
an orderly legislative process. . .. ‘By limiting each bill to a single subject, the issues 
presented by each bill can be better grasped and more intelligently discussed.’”44 The 
Missouri Supreme Court similarly asserted that by limiting each bill to a single subject, 
the rule enables bills to “be easily understood and intelligently discussed, both by 
legislators and the general public.”45 So, too, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has urged 
that the general aim of the rule is to “place restraints on the legislative process and 
encourage an open, deliberative, and accountable government.”46 The intuition is that 
when a bill is limited to a single subject, it is easier for legislators to more fully understand 
the ramifications of enactment and for the public to know what their legislators are up to. 
That can facilitate public input while the measure is pending, or voter efforts to hold 
legislators accountable after enactment. Supporters of the rule have also expressed the 
hopeful assumption that it will “prevent surprise and fraud upon the people and the 
                                                          
42 In re Initiative Petition No. 382, supra, 142 P.3d at 405. Accord, Porten Sullivan, supra, 568 A.2d at 1121 (“to 
avoid the necessity for a legislator to acquiesce in a bill he or she opposes in order to secure useful and necessary 
legislation”). 
43 See, e.g., Kasper, supra, 40 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. at 848-49; Schuck, supra, 28 Cap. L. Rev. at 903; Ruud, supra, 42 Minn. 
L. Rev. at 391, 449-50. 
44 Wirtz v. Quinn, 953 N.E.2d 899, 905 (Ill. 2011), quoting Johnson v. Edgar, 680 N.E.2d 1372 (Ill. 1997).  
45 Rizzo v. State, 189 S.W.3d 576, 578 (Mo. 2006). See also Missouri Roundtable for Life, Inc. v. State, 396 S.W.3d 
348, 351 (Mo. 2013) (the rule “ensures that members of the legislature and the public are aware of the subject 
matter of pending laws”).  
46 Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund (“PAGE”) v. Commonwealth, 877 A.2d 383, 395 (Pa. 2005).  
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legislature”47 by barring special interest groups from hiding deals or giveaways in long 
and complex multi-subject measures.  
III. The Single-Subject Rule in the Courts 
A. Subject 
Courts have regularly recognized the intrinsic difficulty of defining “subject” for 
purposes of enforcing the single-subject requirement.  As the Utah Supreme Court 
recently acknowledged, a “precise formula may well be impossible to craft.”48 Other courts 
have agreed that “[f]or purposes of legislation, ‘subjects’ are not absolute existences to 
be discovered by some sort of a priori reasoning, but are the result of classification for 
convenience of treatment and for greater effectiveness in attaining the general purpose 
of the particular legislative act.”49 As Professor Daniel Hays Lowenstein has emphasized 
a central problem is the level of specificity required or generality permitted in defining 
what constitutes a subject as “any collection of items, no matter how diverse and 
comprehensive will fall ‘within’ a single (broad) subject if one goes high enough up . . . 
and, on the other hand, the most simple and specific idea can always be broken down 
into parts, which may in turn plausibly be regarded as separate (narrow) subjects.”50 
Some courts have emphasized the need to take a broad approach to defining 
“subject.” The Utah Supreme Court has emphasized that “there is no constitutional 
restriction as to the scope or magnitude of the single subject of a legislative act.”51 The 
                                                          
47 Otto v. Wright Co., 920 N.W.2d 446, 456 (Minn. 2018); Stroh Brewery Co. v. State, 954 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Mo. 
1997) (the rule serves to “facilitate orderly procedure, avoid surprise, and prevent ‘logrolling’”).  
48 Gregory v. Shurtleff, 299 P.3d 1098, 1112 (Utah 2013).  
49 Washington Ass’n for Substance Abuse and Violence Prevention v. State, 278 P.2d 632, 642 (Wash. 2012 
(quoting earlier Washington and Indiana courts) 
50 See Lowenstein, supra, 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 941.  
51 Gregory v. Shurtleff, supra 299 P.3d at 1112. 
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Illinois Supreme Court agreed that “[t]he subject may be as broad as the legislature 
chooses,”52 albeit not “so broad that the rule is evaded as a meaningful constitutional 
check on the legislature’s actions”53 – perhaps not the most helpful formula. Indeed, some 
state courts have approved as constitutionally permissible subjects such broad topics as 
“land,”54 “education,”55 “transportation,”56 “utilities,”57 “state taxation,”58 “public safety,”59 
“capital projects,”60 and “operations of state government.”61  
On the other hand, some state high courts have rejected “any broad, expansive, 
approach,”62 and have ruled out certain relatively broad topics. The Maryland Court of 
Appeals concluded that the purpose of “generally regulating corporations is too broad and 
too tenuous” to satisfy the single-subject requirement.”63 The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court has held that “municipalities” is “too broad to qualify for single-subject status”64 and, 
similarly, that “refining civil remedies or relief” and “judicial remedies and sanctions” are 
“far too expansive” to satisfy the single-subject requirement65 -- although the same court 
                                                          
52 Wirtz v. Quinn, supra, 953 N.E.2d at 905.  
53 Id.  
54 State v. First Nat’l Bank of Anchorage, 660 P.2d 406 (Alaska 1982).   
55 Kansas NEA, supra, 387 P.3d at 808-09. 
56 See, e.g., Yute Air Alaska, Inc. v McAlpine, 698 P.2d 1173, 1181 (Alaska. 1985); Wass v. Anderson, 2452 N.W.2d 
131, 137 (Minn. 1977); C.C. Dillon v. City of Eureka, 12 S.W.3d 322 (Mo. 2000). 
57 Kansas One-Call Sys. v. State, 274 P.3d 625 (Kan. 2012). 
58 North Slope Borough v. SOHIO Petroleum Corp., 585 P.2d 534 (Alaska 1978). 
59 Townsend v. State, 767 N.W.2d 11, 13-14 (Minn. 2009). 
60 Wirtz v. Quinn, supra, 953 N.E.2d at 907 (“capital projects is a legitimate single subject”).  
61 Otto v. Wright Co., supra, 910 N.W.2d at 457 (“’the operation of state government’ – is not too broad to pass 
constitutional muster”). But see People v. Reedy, 708 N.E.2d 1114 (Ill. 1999) (rejecting subject of “governmental 
matters”). 
62 Fent v. State ex rel. Okla. Cap. Imp. Auth. (“OCIA”), 214 P.3d 799, 806 (Ok. 2009). 
63 Migdal v. State, supra, 747 A.2d at 1231. 
64 City of Philadelphia v. Comm., 838 A.2d 566, 589 (Pa. 2003). 
65 Comm. v. Neiman, supra, 84 A.3d at 613. 
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also held that the “regulating of gaming” was sufficiently narrow as to be a constitutionally 
permissible subject.66 
Some state constitutional provisions authorize acceptance of some inherently 
broad measures, like appropriations and budget bills, codifications, and comprehensive 
revisions, and some courts similarly recognized that such sweeping multi-part measures 
can constitute a single subject. However, difficulties have arisen when substantive law 
provisions are attached to appropriations bills67 and also in defining what constitutes a 
permissible comprehensive approach. Thus, state courts have divided over whether 
comprehensive tort reform constitutes a single subject. The Alaska Supreme Court, which 
has generally accepted a broad definition of subject, upheld a single tort reform law that 
imposed caps on noneconomic and punitive damages, required payment of half of all 
punitive damages awards to the state, created a statute of repose, adopted a comparative 
allocation of fault between parties and nonparties, provided for a revised offer of judgment 
procedure, and gave hospitals partial immunity from vicarious liability for some 
physicians’ actions.68 The court acknowledged that the law’s provisions “concern different 
matters” but concluded that “they are all within the single subject of ‘civil action.’”69 The 
Ohio and Oklahoma Supreme Courts, however, rejected similar measures, finding, 
respectively that “tort and other civil actions,”70 and “lawsuit reform”71 could not be 
sustained as constitutionally permissible single subjects of legislation. Courts have 
                                                          
66 PAGE, supra, 877 A.3d at 396. 
67 See, e.g., Rudd, supra, 42 Minn. L. Rev. at 413-47; State ex rel Ohio CSEA v. State, 56 N.E.3d 913, 919 (Ohio 2016) 
(“Biennial appropriations bills, which fund the state’s programs and departments, necessarily address wide-ranging 
topics”); Unity Church of St. Paul v. State, 694 N.W.2d 585,  
68 Evans v. State, 56 P.3d 1046 (Alaska 2002). 
69 Id. at 1070. 
70 State ex rel Ohio Academy of Trial lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1101 (Ohio 1999).  
71 Douglas v. Cox Retirement Props., Inc., 302 P.3d 789, 793 (Okla. 2013).  
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similarly struggled over the significance of the length or number of sections of a bill or the 
number of articles or titles of the state code that the measure amends. Although longer, 
more complex bills are certainly more likely to be found to violate the single-subject 
constraint, the fact that the bill amends only a single article or title will not save it,72 and 
the fact that it runs over one hundred pages, with dozens of chapters and multiple 
sections, need not be fatal.73 
Courts frequently acknowledge the lack of clarity in their single-subject 
jurisprudence. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has candidly written that its cases 
indicate that “the line between what is constitutionally acceptable and what is not is often 
blurred.”74 Many of the most prominent recent cases in Pennsylvania and Ohio – two 
states which have witnessed considerable single-subject rule litigation -- have been 
marked by sharp dissents,75 with one Ohio dissenter pointing out that in one case each 
state supreme court justice authored a separate opinion demonstrating “that there was 
little consensus among the justices on the rule’s meaning.”76 A dissenting justice of the 
Colorado Supreme Court similarly lamented “an unmistakable lack of uniformity in our 
treatment of the single-subject requirement.”77 Even when there are no dissents, it is 
                                                          
72 See, e.g., Comm. v. Neiman, supra, 84 A.3d at 612-13; Migdal v. State, supra, 747 A.2d at 1230.  
73 See, e.g. Wirtz v. Quinn, supra, 953 N.E.2d at 905-07, Arangold v. Zehnder, 718 N.E.2d 191 (Ill. 1999) (amending 
twenty-one separate laws): PAGE, supra, 877 A.2d at 392 (bill was 145 pages and included seven chapters and 86 
sections). See also Dragich, supra, 38 Harv. J. Legis. at 144-45. 
74 PAGE, supra, 877 A.2d at 400.  
75 See, e.g., Comm. v. Neiman, supra; Penn. State Ass’n of Jury Comm’rs v. Comm., 64 A.2d3d 611 (Pa. 2013); 
Spahn v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 977 A.2d 1132 (Pa. 2009); CSEA, supra; State ex rel Ohio Civ. Serv. Emp. Ass’n v. 
State Emp. Rel. Bd. (“CSEA v. SERB”), 818 N.E.2d 688 (Ohio 2004); Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 
1999); Sheward, supra; Voinovich, supra.  
76 CSEA v SERB, supra, 818 N.E.2d at 705 (dissenting opinion of Lundberg Stratton, J., joined by O’ 
Connor, J.). 
77 In re Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause for No 2005-2006 No, 74, 136 P.3d 237, 244 (Colo. 2006) (Coats, J., 
dissenting).  
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sometimes difficult to find consistency in a court’s treatment of “subject.” The Oklahoma 
Supreme Court, which has had a heavy docket of single-subject cases in recent years,78 
has both invalidated a law authorizing a single state agency to incur debt to finance three 
different projects,79 while a few years later upholding a law authorizing a different state 
agency to issue bonds to finance four different projects80 -- both times without dissent. 
Although the second decision sought to distinguish the first by finding the common theme 
of turnpike construction and maintenance linked the multiple projects,81 the tension 
between the decisions remains. 
B. Germaneness 
As the Oklahoma turnpike decision indicates, the question in many single subject 
cases is not the definition of “subject” per se, but whether the different topics, sections, 
or parts of a bill are sufficiently closely connected that they can be treated as dealing with 
a single subject. As the Ohio Supreme Court put it, the rule “allows a plurality of topics” 
even as it bars a “disunity of subjects.”82 Indeed, most single-subject disputes involve 
laws that, as enacted, consist of multiple provisions. Courts have developed a range of 
tests for determining whether the multiple parts of a bill are sufficiently related so that 
when combined they constitute but a single subject, including whether they are “rationally 
                                                          
78 See, e.g., Matter Oklahoma Turnpike Auth., 389 P.3d 318 (Okla. 2017); Burns v. Cline, 382 P.3d 1048 Okla. 2016); 
Fent v. Fallin, 315 P.3d 1023 (Okla. 2013); Douglas, supra; Thomas v. Henry, 260 P.3d 1251 (Okla. 2011); Nova 
Health Sys. v. Edmondson, 233 P.3d 380 (Okla. 2010); OCIA, supra; In re Petition No. 382, 142 P.3d 400 (Okla. 
2006).  
79 OCIA, supra, 214 P.3d  
80 Matter of Okla Tpke Auth., supra. 
81 Id. at 320-21. 
82 State ex rel Hinkle v. Franklin Co. Bd. of Elec. 580 N.E.2d 767, 770 (Ohio 1991). 
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related;”83 whether there is a “unifying principle,”84 “natural and logical connection,”85 or a 
“common purpose or relationship . . . between the topics;”86 “whether they have a nexus 
to a common purpose;”87 whether they “fairly relate to the same subject”88 or “relate, 
directly or indirectly, to the same general subject and have a mutual connection;”89 
whether there is a “common thread”90 or “filament”91 linking them to each other, or – from 
the opposite perspective – whether they are “distinct and incongruous”92 or “dissimilar 
and discordant.”93 The most commonly used judicial standard is whether they are 
“germane” or “reasonably germane” to each other or to some general subject.94 
Of course, as other commentators have recognized, “reasonable germaneness” is 
not much more precise or determinate than “subject” itself.95 The body of law the courts 
have produced as they have grappled with the question of whether the different parts of 
a bill are germane to each other or to some overarching subject is not much more 
consistent than the jurisprudence concerning permissible subjects.  
Thus, courts have found sufficient germaneness in laws that combine a tax on 
motor vehicle fuels with authorization of bonds to finance highway construction;96 add an 
                                                          
83 State ex rel Ohio Civ. Serv. Emp. Ass’n v. State, 56 N.E.3d 913, 922 (Ohio 2016). 
84 McIntire v. Forbes, 909 P.2d 846, 855-56 (Pre. 1996).  
85 People v. Cervantes, 723 N.E.2d 265, 267 (Ill. 1999).  
86 Hoover v. Bd. of Franklin Co. Comm’rs, 482 N.E.2d 575, 580 (Ohio 1985).  
87 Neiman, supra, 84 A.3d at 612.  
88 Hammerschmidt v. Boone Co., 877 S.W.2d 98, 102 (Mo. 1994) 
89 Ex parte Jones, 440 S.W.3d 628, 632 (Tex. 2014).  
90 Beagle v. Walden, 676 N.E.2d 506, 507 (Ohio 1997). 
91 Blanch v. Suburban Hennepin Reg. Park Dist., 449 N.W.2d 150, 154-55 (Minn. 1989). 
92 Porten Sullivan Corp. v. State, 568 A.2d 1111, 1121 (Md. 1990) 
93 Kansas Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. State, 387 P.3d 795, 805 (Kans. 2017). 
94 Unity Church of St. Paul, supra, 694 N.W.2d at 593. See generally Kastorf, supra, 54 Emory L.J. at 1661 
(reasonable germaneness most common test for compliance with single subject rule) 
95 See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Michael D. Gilbert, A Theory of Direct Democracy and the Single Subject Rule, 110 
Colum. L. Rev. 687, 710) (“[g]ermaneness provides no clear guidance to the level of abstraction”. 
96 Wass v. Anderson, 252 N.W.2d 131, 135-36 (Minn. 1977). 
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authorization of a park district to acquire land to a bill making appropriations for state 
government;97 combine an authorization of the privatization of liquor sales with funding 
for public safety;98 combine provisions dealing with asbestos abatement, leaking 
underground storage tanks, and water well drilling under the rubric of “environmental 
control;”99 combine local regulation of billboards with funding for the state transportation 
department;100 add a program for the privatization of child support enforcement to a bill 
dealing with welfare reform;101 add an authorization for counties to hire private accounting 
firms to audit their books to the state government finance omnibus bill;102 include  
provisions regulating the sale of prisons to private operators in the state budget bill;103 
and combine funding for emergency medical services with a prohibition on the use of tax 
increment financing in flood plains (on the theory that the financing restriction would 
reduce the need for emergency services).104   
On the other hand, courts have rejected on single-subject grounds measures that 
sought to combine: regulation of long-term care with authorization of the state attorney 
general to enforce regulation of advertising by nursing homes;105 multiple anti-crime and 
neighborhood safety provisions with provisions regulating  (including but not limited to 
criminal punishments for fraud) private providers of public welfare services;106 payment 
of prevailing wage requirements for both publicly and nonpublicly financed school 
                                                          
97 Blanc v. Suburban Hennepin Reg. Park Dist., 449 N.W.2d 150 (Minn. 1989). 
98 Washington Ass’n for Substance Abuse v. State, 278 P.3d 632 (Wash. 2012). 
99 Corvera Abatement Tech. v. Air Conservation Com’n, 973 S.W.2d 851 (Mo. 1998).  
100 C.C. Dillon Co. v. City of Eureka, 12 S.W.3d 322, 327-29 (Mo. 2000). 
101 Maryland Classified Emp. Ass’n v. State, 694 A.2d 937, 942-46 (Md. 1997). 
102 Otto v. Wright Co., 910 N.W.2d 446, 455-57 (Minn. 2018). 
103 State ex rel Ohio CSEA v. State, 56 N.E.3d 913 (Ohio 2016). 
104 City of St. Charles v. State, 165 S.W.3d 149, 151-52 (Mo. 2005). 
105 Missouri Health Care Ass’n v. Attorney General, 953 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1997).  
106 People v. Cervantes, 723 N.E.2d 265 Ill. 1999). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3499721 
16 
 
construction and remodeling projects added to an omnibus tax relief bill;107 a ban on 
persons convicted of a felony from running for elected office in the state with a general 
regulation of political subdivisions including local elections;108 changes to a state’s public 
utilities regulatory fund with changes in the public service commission’s rule-making 
process;109 a provision relating to resident agents of corporations and a provision 
governing directors of investment companies;110 and changes to the state’s workers’ 
compensation system with an exemption from the state’s child labor laws and provision 
for an intentional workplace tort.111 There may be a principle that explains the different 
findings of connection or germaneness across the cases, but it is not easy to discern. 
C. Judicial Deference 
Most courts have declared that they will take a deferential approach to the 
legislature, adopting a “liberal interpretation” of the meaning of “subject” and of the degree 
of connectedness among a bill’s parts necessary to satisfy the germaneness standard. 
Reviewing the state’s case law, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court observed that “[i]n more 
recent decisions . . . Pennsylvania courts have become extremely deferential toward the 
General Assembly in [single-subject] challenges” and have upheld laws as long as “the 
court can fashion a single, over-arching topic to loosely relate the various subjects 
                                                          
107 Assoc. Bldrs & Contrs. v. Ventura, 610 N.W.2d 293 (Minn. 2000). 
108 Rizzo v. State, 189 S.W.3d 576 (Mo. 2006). See also Hammerschmidt v. Boone, 877 S.W.2d 98 (Mo. 1994) 
(rejecting a bill that combined a provision allowing certain counties to adopt, by election, a county constitution 
with a generally relating to local elections); State ex rel Hinkle v. Franklin Co. Bd. of Elec. 580 N.E.2d 767 (Ohio 
1991) (rejecting combination of provisions dealing with judicial elections and local option elections). 
109 Delmarva Power & Light Co. v.  Public Service Comm., 809 A.2d 640 (Md. 2002).  
110 Migdal v. State, 747 A.2d 1225 (Md. 2000). 
111 State ex rel Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich, 631 N.E.2d 582 (Ohio 1994).  
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included in the statute under review.”112 High courts in Alaska,113 Illinois,114 Kansas,115 
Maryland,116 Missouri,117 Minnesota,118 Ohio119 and other states have similarly taken the 
position that they will strike down laws on single subject grounds only if the violation is 
“clearly, plainly, and palpably so,” “manifestly gross and fraudulent,” or shown “beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”120 
The case for such a liberal, deferential approach is clear. It demonstrates respect 
for a coordinate branch of government. If few, if any, laws are struck down on single-
subject grounds, it minimizes the need for the court to articulate a clear and consistent 
standard for determining the meaning of “subject” or “germaneness” or to rationalize the 
different treatment of different cases. And it avoids the extremely knotty question of what 
to do when a law is determined to violate the rule – strike the whole law down; or sever 
the section or sections not germane to the other provisions, strike those down, and sustain 
the rest.121 On the other hand, judicial deference, with the resulting expansive definitions 
                                                          
112 City of Philadelphia, supra, 838 A.2d at 576-77.  
113 See, e.g., Evans v. Kutch, supra, 56 P.3d at 1069 (“only a ‘substantial and plain’ violation of the one subject rule 
will lead us to strike down legislation on this basis”). 
114 Wirtz v. Quinn, supra, 953 N.E.2d at 905 (“we construe the word ‘subject’ liberally in favor of upholding the 
legislation;” a law violates the rule only “when it contains unrelated provision that by no fair interpretation have 
any legitimate relation to the single subject”). 
115 Kansas NEA, supra, 387 P.3d at 808 (“the underlying policy of liberally construing the one-subject rule”). 
116 Porten Sullivan, supra, 568 A.2d at 1118 (“the ‘general disposition of [this] Court has been to give the section a 
liberal construction, so as not to interfere with or impede legislative action’”). 
117 C.C. Dillon Co., supra, 12 S.W.3d at 327 (no violation unless the act “clearly and undoubtedly violates” the rule). 
118 Unity Church, supra, 694 N.W.2d at 594 (“because of the liberal deference given to the legislature, Minnesota 
courts have rarely invalidated laws for a lack of germaneness’). 
119 Ohio CSEA, supra, 56 N.E.3d at 919 (“To accord deference to the General Assembly’s law-making function, we 
must liberally construe the term ‘subject” for purposes of the rule”). 
120 See Dragich, supra, 38 Harv. J. Legis., supra, at 105-06, citing and quoting cases. 
121 On the difficulty of the severability question, see Ruud, supra, 42 Minn. L. Rev. at 396-400; Dragich, supra, 38 
Harv. J. Legis. at 154-63; Voinovich, supra, 631 N.E.2d at 587 (ordering severance); id. at 599-600 and 600-604 
(opinions concurring in finding of single-subject violation, dissenting from remedy of severance); Comm. v. 
Neiman, supra, 84 A.3d at 613-15 (generally rejecting severance because of “the reality that discerning the ‘main’ 
purpose of a piece of legislation becomes an untenable exercise in conjecture when the legislation has 
metamorphosed during the legislative process to include a panoply of additional and disparate subjects”); Ohio 
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of subject and germaneness threaten to undermine the single-subject principle and to 
render a provision of the state constitution a “dead letter.”122 If the purpose of the single-
subject requirement is to reform the operations of the state legislature, it may be odd to 
leave enforcement of the requirement to the legislature itself. Nor is it clear that 
enforcement of the rule would be so disrespectful of the legislature. Like other process 
reforms, the single-subject requirement does not limit the objects of state legislation or 
the goals of state policy, but only the form of the legislation used to achieve those ends. 
There would be no restriction on the legislature enacting separately those measures it 
could not enact together, and many findings of single-subject violations have been 
followed by just such separate enactments.123 
In any event, nearly all the courts that have declared themselves committed to a 
deferential, liberal interpretation of subject have at one time or another struck down laws 
on single-subject grounds.124 “There must be limits”125 -- “[t]here comes a point”126 – the 
courts complain, but the rule of liberal-interpretation-up-to-a-point fails to provide a very 
                                                          
CSEA v. State, supra, 56 N.E.3d at 920 (“the appropriate remedy when a legislative act violates the one-subject rule 
is generally to sever the  offending portion of the act ;’to cure the defect and save the portions” of the act do 
relate to a single subject”). 
122 Porten Sullivan, supra, 568 A.2d 1118. 
123 See, e.g., Rev. Stat. Mo. 290.528 (H.B. 1194 of Laws of 2017), preempting local minimum wage laws, adopted in 
response to the invalidation of a similar preemptive measure invalidated on single-subject grounds in Cooperative 
Home Care, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 514 S.W.2d 571 (Mo. 2017); Comment, It’s Still a Peanut Butter Cookie: A 
Comment on Douglas v. Cox Retirement Properties, Inc., 39 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 243, 262-63 (2014) (following 
Oklahoma Supreme Court’s invalidation of tort reform law on single-subject grounds, governor called a special 
session of the legislature which passed 23 separate bills which had been part of the invalid comprehensive 
measure). 
124 See, e.g., for Illinois, People v. Cervantes, supra; People v. Reedy, supra; Johnson v. Edgar, 680 N.E.2d 1372; for 
Maryland, Porten Sullivan, supra; Migdal v. State; Delmarva Power & Light, supra; for Minnesota, Unity Church; 
supra; for Missouri, Cooperative Home Care, supra; Missouri Roundtable for Life, Inc., supra; for Ohio, Sheward, 
supra; Simmons-Harris v. Goff, supra; for Pennsylvania, Comm. v. Leach, supra, Comm. v. Neiman, supra; Penn. 
State Ass’n of Jury Comm’rs, supra; Spahn v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, supra; City of Philadelphia v. Comm., supra.  
125 City of Philadelphia, supra, 838 A.2d at 578;  
126 Sheward, supra, 715 N.E.2d 1101.  
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predictable or neutral principle, and contributes to concerns that application of the rule is 
driven by the policy or political views of the judges.127  
D. Some Recent Cases 
A brief review of recent cases – all from the current decade – from a half-dozen 
state supreme courts around the country may give a fuller sense of the difficulty inherent 
in applying the rule. Although some readers – and this author – may conclude that in 
some of the cases the “single-subject” question was pretty easy and that the court got it 
right,128 in others the issue was far more difficult and the wisdom of the decision far more 
debatable. 
To begin, there are at least two cases involving what seem to be easy violations 
of the rule. In 2016, in Leach v. Commonwealth,129 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
struck down a law that consisted of four substantive sections addressing: trespass for the 
purpose of unlawfully taking secondary metal130 from a premises; theft of secondary metal 
as an independent offense; state police disclosure of records; and standing for individuals 
or organizations to challenge local gun regulations. The provisions could be linked only 
if, as the legislative leaders contended, they addressed “the subject of amending the 
Crimes Code.”131 Such a “subject” would pass constitutional muster only at a very high 
                                                          
127 See, e.g., Michael D. Gilbert, Does Law Matter? Theory and Evidence from Single-Subject Adjudication, 40 J. Leg. 
Stud. 333, 355 (2011) (finding that judicial ideology had a “consistent, statistically significant relationship with 
judges’ votes” particularly in cases implicating “fundamental values”); Survey of the Single-Subject Rule as Applied 
to Statewide Initiatives, 13 J. Contemp. Leg. Issues 579, 593-96 (2004); Hoffer & McDade, supra, 51 Clev. St. L. Rev. 
at 569 (Ohio Supreme Court’s Sheward decision “as much a political shake-up as a judicial pronouncement”). 
128 Professor Gilbert found that student coders frequently agreed with judges’ categorization of the number of 
subjects in a measure. See Gilbert, Does Law Matter?, supra, 40 J. Leg. Stud. at 346, 354. 
129 141 A.3d 426 (Pa. 2016). 
130 “Secondary metal” refers to metal such as copper and aluminum or wire and cable used by utilities and 
transportation agencies. Id. at 427.  
131 Id. at 431. 
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level of abstraction, which conceivably might have sufficed if the law was a 
comprehensive revision of the criminal code, which it wasn’t. Similarly, in 2017, the 
Missouri Supreme Court held in Cooperative Home Care, Inc. v. City of St. Louis132 that 
a law combining “the establishment, proper governance, and operation of community 
improvement districts” with a prohibition on municipalities setting a minimum wage higher 
than that set by the state violated Missouri’s single-subject rule. It’s not clear what “single 
subject” could have held these two parts together since the party defending the local 
minimum wage ban argued only that collateral estoppel from an earlier decision barred 
the city from raising the statute’s invalidity as a defense, and the court simply declared 
without analysis that the minimum wage preemption was “not connected to, related to, or 
germane to” the regulation of community improvement districts.133 
On the other hand, two cases from Kansas and Utah dealing with laws broadly 
addressing education issues reached the seemingly reasonable conclusion that they 
dealt with a single subject, education. The Utah law addressed a number of education 
issues ranging from the state’s school aid formula, to the funding of charter schools, 
requirements regarding educational materials, teacher salaries, a number of pilot 
programs, and appropriations for the pilot programs, pupil transportation, classroom 
supplies, and arts education.134 Not only could many of these measures have been 
enacted as separate laws, but in fact the bill was an amalgamation of what had originally 
been fourteen separate bills.135 It is possible that some legislators supported some of 
                                                          
132 514 S.W.3d 571 (Mo. 2017). 
133 Id. at 580-81. 
134 Gregory v. Shurtleff, 299 P.3d 1098, 118 (Utah 2013).  
135 Id. at 1115. 
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these measures and not others and, as a result, had to cast votes inconsistent with their 
topic-by-topic preferences. Nonetheless, if the single-subject rule is to permit 
comprehensive approaches to legislative subjects, this would appear to be such a case. 
The Kansas education case, Kansas NEA v. State,136 arguably pushes the envelope a bit 
more. Adopted in response to a state supreme court decision invalidating portions of the 
state’s public school finance laws, the challenged law “had a sweeping scope” including 
the appropriation of new state school aid, the cancellation of prior appropriations for non-
education purposes to fund the new school aid, “substantive and technical changes to the 
state’s public school financing statutes,” appropriations and transfer of land to state 
universities, a tax credit for businesses that contribute to organizations that provide 
scholarships to low-income students, changes to high school teacher licensing 
requirements, “performance-based incentives for GED and career education 
matriculation and enrollment at state universities,” and most controversially, changes to 
the Teacher Due Process Act to remove protections from many elementary and 
secondary public school teachers concerning the termination or nonrenewal of their 
contracts.137 As the court acknowledged, the law contained multiple topics affecting the 
operations of public schools, benefits for students, state universities, and touched many 
different government agencies.138 As the lawsuit by the NEA suggests, there could easily 
have been opposition to the elimination of teacher due process protections from 
legislators who favor increased funding for schools. Yet, applying the “policy of liberally 
construing the one-subject rule,”139 all the measures seemed germane to education and 
                                                          
136 387 P.3d 795 (Kans. 2017). 
137 Id. at 798, 803-04.  
138 Id. at 808-09. 
139 Id. at 808. 
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“the term ‘education’ is not so broad that it fails to limit the area in which the legislature 
may operate.”140 
Turning to some arguably closer cases, in Wirtz v. Quinn,141 the Illinois Supreme 
Court sustained a complex, multi-part law intended to authorize and fund a massive 
capital projects program. Its provisions included, inter alia, raising and reallocating the 
proceeds of a range of different taxes and fees; authorizing a pilot program allowing 
individuals to purchase state lottery tickets on the internet, reallocating the proceeds of 
the state lottery, and directing a named state university to conduct a study of the effects 
on Illinois families of purchasing lottery tickets; increasing the weight limits for vehicles 
and loads, and authorizing, regulating, and taxing video gaming. On its face this would 
seem to include multiple subjects. But the Illinois court rationalized that they were all 
related to financing the capital program. The authorization of video gaming and of the on-
line purchase of lottery tickets was intended to generate funds for the capital program, 
and the study of the impact of the lottery on families was a response to the expansion of 
the lottery program. The increased weight and load limits for motor vehicles was an offset 
to the increase in motor vehicle fees and fines for overweight vehicles – which was one 
of the many sources of funds for the capital program.142 The court made a plausible case 
that it all hangs together, although other commentators have sharply disagreed.143 
                                                          
140 Id. at 809. 
141 953 N.E.2d 899 (Ill. 2011).  
142 Id. at 904-11.  
143 See, e.g., Block, Broke: The Pocketbook of Illinois and the Single Subject Rule After Wirtz v. Quinn, 953 NE.2d 
899 (Ill. 2011), 37 So. I. L.J. 237, 246 (2012) (“wrongly decided,” “increased uncertainty in an already uncertain area 
of law, undermined the principles underlying the single subject rule”); Apadula, State Constitutional Law – Single 
Subject Rule – The Illinois Supreme Court Adopts an Irrebutable Presumption of Constitutionality for Legislation 
Challenged by the Single Subject Rule, Wirtz v. Quinn, 953 N.E.2d 899 (Ill. 2011), 43 Rutgers L.J. 617, 634 
(2013)(“render[s] the single subject rule a dead letter”).  
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 Less persuasive – to this author, at least -- are two other state court decisions that 
found that substantive policy provisions tucked into budget bills satisfied the single-
subject requirement. In 2016 in State ex rel Ohio Civil Service Employees Ass’n v. 
State,144 the Ohio Supreme Court held that the inclusion in the biennial budget bill of 
provisions changing the law governing the terms for the privatizing of prison operations 
and authorizing the operation, management, and sale of five prison facilities did not 
violate the single-subject rule. The privatization of prison operations and the sale of prison 
facilities would save costs and generate revenue for the state and thus fell within the 
subject of “budgeting for the operation of the state government.”145 But on that theory, of 
course, any law with state fiscal implications could be considered as part of the subject 
of budgeting for the operation of state government – certainly, an enormous subject. 
Similarly, in Otto v. Wright County,146 the Minnesota Supreme Court in 2018 determined 
that including in the State Government Omnibus Finance Act a provision enabling 
counties to choose to have their required annual audit performed by a CPA firm instead 
of by the state auditor did not violate the single-subject rule because that was “clearly 
germane to the subject of state government operations,” which was the subject of the 
Act.147 Although the county audit option could potentially reduce the workload of the state 
auditor, the amendment seems to be really far more about the powers and duties of 
counties than the operations of state government.148 
                                                          
144 56 N.E.3d 913 (Ohio 2016). 
145 Id. at 922. 
146 910 N.W.2d 446 (Minn. 2018). 
147 Id. at 457. 
148 Cf. Rizzo v. State, 189 S.W.3d 576, 580-81 (Mo. 2006) (invalidating provision of a law dealing primarily with local 
governments that also applied to state elections).  
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 Finally, there is the divided Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision in Douglas v. 
Retirement Properties, Inc.,149 invalidating that state’s Comprehensive Lawsuit Reform 
Act. The majority stressed that the law contained ninety sections that included multiple 
amendments to the civil procedure code plus many new acts dealing with, inter alia 
emergency volunteer health practitioners, asbestos and silica claims, mandatory seat belt 
use, livestock activities liability, firearm manufacturers liability, and school discipline.150 
Without much analysis151 the majority simply concluded that the multiple provisions were 
“unrelated” to each other and that “[m]any . . . have nothing in common.”152 By contrast, 
the two dissenters emphasized there was a common theme: “the legislature and the 
public understood the common themes and purposes understood in the legislation; it was 
tort reform.”153 They also pointed out the legislature had previously enacted, without 
successful single-subject objection, such broad measures as the ten-article and 368-
section Uniform Commercial Code, and a 78-section Evidence Code, and that the 
majority’s treatment of the tort reform law would create “substantial difficulty” for the 
legislature to pass “comprehensive legislation including any uniform codes that are 
generally adopted among the states.”154 In their view, the “majority opinion gives little 
                                                          
149 302 P.3d 789 (Ok. 2013). 
150 Id. at 793-94. 
151 The majority devoted five paragraphs to the discussion of the law and the application of the single-subject rule 
to it, including one that focused solely on whether severance rather than complete invalidation was a possible 
remedy. Id.  
152 Id. For a critical assessment of the decision and an argument that it is inconsistent with Oklahoma single-subject 
precedents, see Comment, It’s Still a Peanut Butter Cookie: A Comment on Douglas v. Cox Retirement Properties, 
Inc., 39 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 243 (2014). 
153  302 P.2d at 802. 
154 Id. at 802-03.  
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guidance”155 for distinguishing between impermissibly sweeping multi-part laws and 
acceptable comprehensive ones. 
 A striking feature of the dueling opinions in Douglas was the Oklahoma justices’ 
focus on the anti-logrolling purpose often invoked to explain and justify the single-subject 
rule. The majority expressly framed its analysis in light the rule’s anti-logrolling purpose.156 
Without citing any specific instances of logrolling in the legislative history, the majority 
concluded that in a bill with so many different sections and topics, legislators were 
inevitably “faced with an all-or-nothing choice” which would require them to vote for 
provisions they did not want “to ensure the passage of favorable legislation.”157 The 
dissent, however, saw the range of multiple provisions in the bill as evidence of legislative 
compromise. In any complex measure, “[i]t is likely that some of the legislators who voted 
in favor or the bill compromised to secure its passage.”158 But in the dissent’s view that is 
a feature and not a bug as “[l]egislation requires some compromise.”159 
 The division in Douglas points to the possibility of anti-logrolling and the other 
purposes behind the single-subject rule in providing a more workable standard than the 
text of the rule itself for applying the rule, as well as the difficulties in doing so. That is the 
focus of the next Part. 
IV. From Text to Purpose: Anti-Logrolling and Anti-Riders as Standards for 
Enforcement 
                                                          
155 Id. at 802 
156 Id. at 792. 
157 Id. at 793. 
158 Id. at 803. 
159 Id.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3499721 
26 
 
Like the Oklahoma judges in Douglas, many courts and commentators have sought 
to resolve the intractable question of how to define “subject” by turning to the purposes 
long seen as explaining and justifying the single-subject rule: prevention of logrolling and 
riders, and more generally protection of the legislative process from are often 
characterized as improper manipulations.160 Logrolling, in particular, has long been 
condemned. Indeed, “in the United States at least, . . . this word has always had pejorative 
connotations.”161 By definition, an act put together by logrolling consists of measures 
which, considered individually, lacked majority support. Hence, its enactment is often 
seen as inconsistent with majority rule. Logrolling has been particularly criticized for 
facilitating the passage of wasteful “Christmas tree” bills and pork-barrel legislation, that 
is, laws that provide concentrated benefits – typically, subsidies; tax breaks; restrictive 
licensing requirements; tariffs; and roads, harbors and other highly targeted infrastructure 
investments – to a small number of interests but impose broader costs on consumers and 
taxpayers.162 The notorious Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930 is often cited as an example of 
how logrolling enables the coalition backing the law to win benefits for its benefits for the 
special interest groups promoting the tariff, at a cost to the nation as a whole.163 Some 
courts, like the Oklahoma Supreme Court and the Maryland Court of Appeals, have also 
emphasized the way in which such a logroll coerces legislators to vote for provisions they 
                                                          
160 See, e.g., Comm. v. Heiman, supra, 84 A.3d at 611-12; Wirtz v. Quinn, supra, 953 N.E.2d at 905-05; Rizzo v. 
State, supra, 189 S.W.3d at 578.; Simmons-Harris v. Goff, supra, 711 N.E.2d at 214 (“logrolling . . . was the very evil 
the one-subject rule was designed to prevent”); Denning & Smith, supra, 1999 Utah L. Rev. at 968; Schuck, supra, 
28 Cap. L. Rev. at 901 (prevention of logrolling as the “primary and generally recognized purpose” for the single-
subject rule); Hoffer & McDade, supra, 51 Clev. St. L. Rev. at 558. 
161 William H. Riker and Steven J. Brams, The Paradox of Vote Trading, 67 A.P.S.R. 1235, 1235 (1973 
162 See, e.g., Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice 51 (Cambridge U. Press 1979) 
163 See, e.g., Riker and Brams, supra, 67 A.P.S.R. at 1235, citing the classic study by E.E. Schattschneider, Politics, 
Pressures and the Tariff (Prentice-Hall 1935).  
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do not actually support or against a provision they would otherwise support because it 
has been combined with measures they oppose.164  
An early application of the single-subject rule by the Michigan Supreme Court to strike 
down an act that appropriated state funds for the improvement of three different state 
roads is a classic example of the anti-logrolling philosophy at work. As Chief Justice 
Thomas Cooley explained, the roads were 
 “distinct objects of legislation which might, with entire propriety, have been provided 
for by separate acts, and indeed, ought to have been, in view of the care which is 
taken by the Constitution to compel each distinct object of legislation to be considered 
separately. These objects have certainly no necessary connection, and being grouped 
together in one bill, legislators are not only preclude[d] from expressing by their votes 
their opinion on each separately; but they are so united, as to invite a combination of 
interests among the friends of each, in order to secure the success of all, when, 
perhaps, neither could be passed separately. The evils of that species of omnibus 
legislation which the constitution designed to prohibit, are all invited by acts thus 
framed.”165 
Despite this longstanding hostility to legislation by logrolling, modern scholarship has 
recognized that logrolling – or, less pejoratively, vote-trading – may actually be socially 
desirable because it recognizes that legislators have different intensities of preference for 
different measures. A proposal may enjoy only minority support not so much because the 
majority is actively hostile to it but rather because the majority is largely indifferent or only 
weakly opposed. Logrolling allows legislators to obtain passage of the measures they 
more strongly support at the modest price of voting for measures they are apathetic about 
or only mildly oppose. As a result, logrolling can make more legislators better off. To the 
extent legislators accurately represent the interests of their constituents, logrolling can 
                                                          
164 See, e.g., Thomas v. Henry, 260 P.3d 1251, 1260 (Ok. 2011) (expressing concern that with logrolling “many of 
those voting on the law would be faxed with an unpalatable all-or-nothing choice”); Porten Sullivan, supra, 568 
A.2d at 1121. 
165 People ex rel Estes v. Denahy, 20 Mich. 349, 351-52 (1870). 
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enhance the overall well-being of the community. Moreover, logrolling may be particularly 
beneficial to certain legislative groups, particularly weaker parties or representatives of 
minority ethnic groups, that ordinarily lack the votes to get the measures they care most 
about passed. By being able to make vote-trading deals with some members of the 
majority, there is at least some prospect they can advance some items of their legislative 
agenda. Moreover, as some commentators have noted, logrolling need not involve only 
pork-barrel legislation but may embrace “what are truly pure public goods, e.g., defense, 
education, and the environment.”166  
To be sure, there is no guarantee that logrolling will be welfare-enhancing. The ability 
of a legislative minority to advance its goals through logrolling will depend on the skills, 
information, and resources of the legislators.167 And the majority put together by logrolling 
might still impose costs on the community as a whole that are greater than the benefits 
to the logrolling coalition. But it is fair to say that there is no reason to assume that 
majorities put together by logrolling categorically impose net social costs or that they are 
more net costly than majorities composed of a single group.168 It is even more unlikely 
that courts will be able to tell the difference.169 
Of course, even if the prejudice against logrolling is mistaken, that alone might not 
matter for challenging the role of a concern about logrolling in applying the single-subject 
rule. The real difficulty is distinguishing improper logrolling from the deal-making and 
compromises that are “pervasive” in collective bodies and “normally characteristic of 
                                                          
166 See Mueller, supra, at 51-52.  
167 See Hardy Lee Wieting, Jr., Philosophical problems in Majority Rule and the Logrolling Solution, 76 Ethics 85. 93 
(1966). 
168 See, e.g., Riker & Brams, supra, 67 A.P.S.R. at 1246. 
169 See, e.g., Kastorp, supra, 54 Emory L.J. at 1663-65. 
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representative assemblies.”170 Such deal-making is often a critical means for contending 
groups to compromise their differences and reach a collective decision.171  Although the 
Illinois Supreme Court once asserted “there is a difference between impermissible 
logrolling and the normal compromise which is inherent ion the legislative process,”172  it 
is not clear that’s correct. Even a close review of the legislative history behind a bill173 
may not help as the question is less one of fact and more of interpretation and acceptance 
of legislative practices. 
 As the Utah Supreme Court explained, “the line between forbidden log-rolling and 
mere horse-trading may be a fine one.”174 The Minnesota Court of Appeals went further 
in defending a challenged bill against the claim that it was the result of impermissible 
logrolling: “If the historical nature of legislation was that every single provision of a larger 
bill had to be able to pass both houses of the legislature and obtain the governor’s 
signature on its own merits, little if any legislation would ever be signed into law. . . . The 
practice of bundling controversial, volatile provisions with germane and less-controversial 
laws is not impermissible logrolling. Rather it is the nature of the democratic process. . . . 
The negotiations and the constant give and take are historical, purely legal, and purely 
permissible.”175Indeed, courts have defended the  “liberal” approach to interpreting the 
single-subject rule as essential “to accommodate a significant range and degree of 
                                                          
170 James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional 
Democracy 134 (U. Mich. Press 1962). Cf. Frank Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domain, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 548 (1983) 
(treating logrolling as an “accepted part[] of the legislative process”). 
171 See, e.g., Kastorf, supra, 54 Emory L.J. at 1647 (describing logrolling as “the necessary lubrication to overcome 
collective action problems”). 
172 Wirtz v. Quinn, supra, 953 N.E.2d at 911. 
173 The Wirtz court engaged in such a close review. See id. at 909-11. 
174 Gregory v. Shurtleff, supra, 299 P.3d at 1116. 
175 Defenders of Wildlife v. Ventura, 632 N.W.2d 707, 714-15 (Minn. App. 2001), rev. den. 
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political compromise that necessarily attends the legislative process in a healthy, robust 
democracy.”176  
The concern that bills that result from logrolling somehow coerce legislators into voting 
against their preferences seems even weaker than the claim that bills composed of 
provisions that might not have passed on their own violates proper legislative norms.  
Compromise necessarily involves votes at odds with one’s ideal position. As Professor 
Dan Lowenstein crisply put it: “Most choices in life involve trade-offs.”177 Or as one 
member of Congress noted in early February 2019 in explaining his vote for the bill that 
prevented the recurrence of a second partial government shutdown, “When you strike a 
deal you get some things you want and you get some things that you don’t like.”178 
In theory, the case against riders may be stronger than the case against logrolling. By 
definition, a rider is attached to a bill that already enjoys majority support so that its 
backers should not have had to vote for the rider in order to get their measure enacted. 
Michael Gilbert speculates that riders are more likely to result from the ability of powerful 
individual legislators to manipulate rules and procedures to get their particular proposals 
attached to a popular bill and to block efforts to strip the rider out.179 In his view, riders 
are always anti-majoritarian and, by definition, leave a majority of legislators worse off as 
they would have preferred to vote for the bill in question without the rider.180 He would 
                                                          
176 MCEA, supra, 694 A.2d at 943. 
177 Daniel Hays Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single-Subject Rule, 30 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 936, 958 (1983).  
178 Paul Kane, “The bill to avert a shutdown has few eager to claim parentage,” Wash. Post, Feb. 13, 2019 (quoting 
Rep. Gregory Meeks (D-NY)). 
179 See Gilbert, supra, 67 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 836-43.  
180 See also Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 873, 923 (1987) 
(enforcement of the single-subject rule “is particularly appropriate when substantive riders have been established 
to appropriations legislation’).  
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reframe the single-subject rule exclusively around the prevention of riders.181 Yet, in 
practice, it may be difficult to distinguish a rider from a logroll. As the earliest study of the 
single-subject rule found, determining whether a provision is a rider is a “troublesome 
question.”182 Before enactment, a bill’s proponents may be unsure whether the measure 
actually enjoys majority support or is, instead, a few votes short of passage and so is 
willing to accept an amendment that brings along a few more votes. Is such a provision a 
logroll or a rider?183 Assessing the provisions of an act after enactment, a court trying to 
distinguish a logroll from a rider “would have to make unseemly, and possibly difficult 
judgments about the relative popularity of various provisions and the motivations of the 
sponsors.”184 Indeed, a close assessment of Illinois’s Wirtz decision concluded that “the 
attempt to distinguish between the two [logrolling and riders] may be futile.”185 The fact 
that a provision, subsequently folded into a bigger bill, did not pass on its own does not 
make it a rider.186 And even critics of riders recognize that, like logrolls, they can be 
socially beneficial and make net contributions to social well-being.187 
Several judges taking a legislative-process-focused approach to the single-subject 
rule have emphasized that the troublesome sections of a bill – whether logroll or rider – 
                                                          
181 Gilbert, supra, 67 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 836-43. 
182 Ruud, supra, 42 Minn. L. Rev. at 400. 
183 See, e.g., Kastorf, supra, 54 Emory L.J. at 1646. See also Richard Briffault, The Item Veto in State Courts, 66 
Temp. L. Rev. 1171, 1189-94 (1993) (considering the difficulties courts have distinguishing between improper 
riders and acceptable conditions in item veto cases).  
184 Lowenstein, supra, 30 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 963. Cf. Martha J. Dragich, State Constitutional Restrictions on 
Legislative Procedure: Rethinking the Analysis of Original Purpose, Single Subject, and Clear Title Challenges, 38 
Harv. J. Legis. 103, 161-62 (2001) (analyzing two Missouri single-subject cases and finding it “hard to say” whether 
the laws at issue involved logrolls or riders). 
185 Block, supra, 37 So. Ill. U. L. Rev. at 250. 
186 See, e.g., Gregory v. Shurtleff, supra, 294 P.3d at 1112; Ex parte Jones, 440 S.W.3d 628, 634 (Tex. 2014); Cf. 
Defenders of Wildlife, supra, 632 N.W.2d at 714 (“the fact that a controversial bill could not pass as a stand-alone 
bill, while not irrelevant, is not conclusive proof of impermissible logrolling”). 
187 See Gilbert, supra, 67 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 839. 
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were added at the “last minute” or the “eleventh hour.” 188 This underscores the single-
subject rule’s purposes of making sure that legislators are able to understand and 
deliberate what they are voting on measures and that the legislative process is 
transparent to the broader the public to keep track of legislative action. This emphasis on 
surprising late in the process additions also implies some kind of legislative chicanery that 
would support a judicial decision to strike down a measure. However, many state 
legislatures operate under requirements of time-limited legislative sessions.189 Some of 
these are as short as twenty to thirty legislative days or sixty to ninety calendar days;190 
in four states, the legislature meets only for a limited number of days every other year.191 
Frequent amendments to pending legislation are surely a part of the legislative process 
to begin with.192 But tight session limits put a lot of pressure to get the legislative business 
done in a very short period and make it even more likely that there will be a rush of 
amendments, combinations of previously separate measures into bigger bills, and a surge 
of deal-making as the end of the legislative session approaches. From the perspective of 
an idealized, orderly and deliberative legislative process, this is surely unfortunate. But, 
as one Ohio Supreme Court justice observed, however “distasteful” and “ugly” the 
process may be, that does not make it unconstitutional.193 
                                                          
188 See, e.g., Delmarva, supra, 809 A.2d at 645-46; Porten Sullivan, supra, 568 A.2d at 1114-15; Voinovich, supra, 
631 N.E.2d at 601-02 (concurring opinion); Leach, supra, 141 A.3d at 430; Spahn, supra, 977 A.2d at 1146. 
189 See Nat’l Conf. of State Legs., “Legislative Session Length, “ http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-
legislatures/legislative-session-length.aspx (noting that 39 state legislatures are under state constitutional, 
statutory, or other restrictions on the length of the legislative session). 
190 Id. 
191 See Nat’l Conf. of State Legs., “Annual vs. Biennial Legislative Sessions,” http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-
state-legislatures/annual-vs-biennial-legislative-sessions.aspx.  
192 See, e.g., PAGE, supra, 877 A.2d at 395. 
193 Beagle v. Walden, 676 N.E.2d 506, 510 (Ohio 1997) (Pfeifer, J., concurring in part). 
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It is difficult – probably impossible – to quarrel with the goals of improved 
deliberation, transparency, and accountability norms. The real issues are whether 
attention to those concerns, and the logrolls and riders said to violate them, helps 
determine what is a subject and when is the single-subject rule violated. There can be 
logrolls and riders within a single subject, and omnibus or multi-part bills which are put 
together for convenience or for the comprehensive treatment of a subject. Indeed. in at 
least some circumstances, legislative deliberation, effective law-making, transparency 
and public accountability may be better served by multi-part bills that comprehensively 
address a complex or multifaceted problem194  as by narrower measures that address the 
issues piecemeal. Improper manipulations of the legislative process – if they can be 
judicially identified – may be evidence that a new law goes beyond a single subject, but 
it is not clear that even a close review of the legislative process can resolve the meaning 
of “subject.” 
V. Conclusion 
The single-subject rule presents a paradox. It is ”part of the fundamental structure of 
legislative power articulated in [the] constitution”195 of the vast majority of states, and it 
reflects and seeks to promote a noble vision of deliberative, majoritarian, and accountable 
law-making. But it has proven all but impossible to consistently implement, or even to 
                                                          
194 See, e.g., State ex rel Ohio CSEA v. State, supra, 56 N.E.3d at 919 (a large number of topics may be combined 
“for the purposes of bringing greater order and cohesion to the law”); Wirtz v. Quinn, 953 N.E..2d 899, 911 (ill. 
2011) (rejecting single-subject challenge to a “diverse and complex” enactment); Maryland Classified Employees 
Ass’n, Inc. v. State, 694 A.2d 937, 943 (Md. 1997); Kastorf, supra, 54 Emory L.J. at 1666. Cf. Gellert v. State, 522 
P.2d 1120, 1122 (Alaska 1974) (if the rule were interpreted too narrowly, “statutes might be restricted unduly in 
scope and permissible subject matter, thereby multiplying and complicating the number of necessary enactment[s] 
and their interrelationships”) 
195 Gregory v. Shurtleff, supra, 299 P.3d at 1108. 
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consistently define. Although some commentators have criticized the courts for excessive 
deference to the legislatures and have urged that more aggressive enforcement will 
improve legislative performance, that seems unlikely to occur. The problems of subject 
definition and consistent application would only get worse with more aggressive 
enforcement efforts. Nor is it clear that more aggressive enforcement would affect 
legislative behavior. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has taken a more stringent approach 
than many other state courts and has frequently struck down laws on single-subject 
grounds but the legislature continues to pass laws the court finds objectionable, leading 
the court to complain of “growing weary of admonishing the Legislature for so flagrantly 
violating the Oklahoma Constitution.”196  
The single-subject rule’s view of relatively tidy, separate topic-by-topic deliberation 
and enactment is often in tension with the coalition-building and deal-making necessary 
for the legislative process to work in practice. Comprehensive, multi-topic legislation will 
often be necessary, if not desirable, in order for the legislature to act at all, and a 
proliferation of small, piecemeal measures that would result from the strict construction 
of the single-subject rule would not improve legislative efficiency or, given the time limits 
many legislatures are under, legislative deliberation. 
Having been a part of the constitutions of most states for roughly a century and a half, 
the single-subject rule is likely here to stay, and as a part of a state’s constitution it 
deserves some respect if not active enforcement. It may be that the best approach to the 
                                                          
196 Nova Health Systems v. Edmondson, 233 P.3d 380, 382 (Ok. 2010). At the time of the Nova Health decision, the 
Oklahoma court had found seven violations of the rule over the preceding two decades. Since then, the court has 
found at least four more violations. See Thomas v. Henry, supra; Douglas v. Cox Retirement Properties, supra; Fent 
v. Fallin, supra; and Burns v. Cline, supra. The court also sustained at least one law in the face of a single-subject 
attack. Matter of Okla Tpke Auth, supra. 
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rule is the one most states take most of the time – broad definitions of subject and 
deference to the legislature, with occasional invalidation of the most egregious 
combinations of seemingly unrelated subjects. This seems more justified and more likely 
to occur, paradoxically, not in the large, complex omnibus measures that advocates of 
the rule decry, but which may be desirable for coalition-building and for comprehensive 
treatment of a subject, but in smaller laws, combining just a handful of laws or 
amendments on discrete topics, which can be claimed as single subject at only the 
highest level of abstraction, likely “amending the crimes code”197 or “judicial remedies and 
sanctions.”198 
In the end, the paradox posed by the single-subject rule is probably unsolvable. More 
aggressive enforcement would disrupt the legislative process for uncertain gains, and 
probably still would not generate a consistent definition of “subject” or a predictable body 
of law. Complete non-enforcement would fly in the face of the requirements of state 
constitutions. General deference with intermittent enforcement in the most egregious 
cases – with the meaning of “egregious” left open – is what we have now and is in tension 
with the rule of law values of consistency and predictability. It is probably the least bad 
approach, but still unsatisfactory.  
The purposes of the single-subject rule – majority rule, deliberation, transparency, 
orderly procedure, public accountability – are surely desirable legislative process goals, 
if not essential to legislative legitimacy. But the experience of the single-subject rule 
                                                          
197 See, e.g., Leach v. Comm., supra.  
198 See, e.g., Comm. v. Heiman, supra. 
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suggests that a judicially-enforceable constitutional requirement may not be the best way 
to achieve those ends. 
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